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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of Maldives is a small island nation located in the 
Indian Ocean, consisting of 1,192 small, low lying coral islands.1 The 
Maldives have been inhabited for up to 2,500 years2 and it has a 
current population of approximately 350,000.3 But the Maldivian 
islands may not exist for another 2,500 years because of climate 
change. 
Fossil fuel emissions and changes in land use are increasing 
global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols, 
which taken together lead to regional and global changes in 
temperature.4 This phenomenon, known as climate change, brings 
with it many dramatic and potentially devastating environmental, 
social and economic effects on a global scale.5 Increases in global 
temperature create changes in precipitation and other climate 
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 1. REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS HOUSING AND 
ENVIRONMENT, FIRST NATIONAL COMMUNICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2001) [hereinafter 
MALDIVES COMMUNICATION]. 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. CIA World Fact Book: Maldives, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ 
mv.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2005). 
 4. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THE REGIONAL IMPACTS 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE: AN ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY 3 (Robert Watson et al. eds., 
1997) (explaining climate change science). 
 5. See id. (summarizing the adverse consequences of climate change). 
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variables, potentially leading to drastic worldwide environmental 
transformations, including a global mean sea level rise,6 changes in 
soil moisture levels, and increased likelihood of extreme high-
temperature events such as floods and droughts.7 Such environmental 
change will in turn affect societies and economies by impacting food 
and water resources, 8  ecosystems and biodiversity, 9  human 
settlements,10 and human health.11 
In response to climate change, the international community 
entered into a treaty known as the Kyoto Protocol that bound its 
signatories to commit to reductions in national greenhouse gas 
emission levels.12 However, the United States is currently not part of 
the protocol.13 A major factor behind the American government’s 
failure to adopt the Kyoto Protocol was its potentially huge economic 
implementation costs and its adverse effect on American business 
profitability.14 The United States absence from the protocol reflects in 
part the American corporate community’s unwillingness to address 
the problem of climate change, and the United States government has 
failed to address the situation sufficiently.15 
Environmentally and socially conscious activists have tried to 
remedy this corporate attitude through the shareholder proposal 
 
 6. See id. (predicting that global mean sea level will rise by 15-95 cm by 2100). 
 7. See id. (describing how climate change may alter the global environment). 
 8. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 12 (Robert Watson et al. eds., 2001) 
(illustrating how changes in rainfall will lead to decreasing crop yields and exacerbate water 
shortages in many water-scarce regions in the world). 
 9. See id. at 16 (describing how a shift in climatically defined habitats may lead to a 
breakdown of terrestrial and marine ecosystems resulting in increased risk of species 
extinction). 
 10. See id. at 12 (warning that populations that inhabit small islands, deltas, or low lying 
coastal areas will face the risk of displacement). 
 11. See id. at 9 (stating that climate change can affect human health through fluctuating 
temperature stresses, loss of life in floods and storms, and changes in disease vectors, water 
quality and food availability). 
 12. See, e.g., Richard W. Thackeray Jr., Struggling for Air: The Kyoto Protocol, Citizens’ 
Suits Under the Clean Air Act and the United States’ Options for Addressing Climate Change, 14 
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 855, 866-71 (2004) (outlining the history of the Kyoto Protocol). 
 13. See Kyoto Protocol, Status of Ratification (last modified on Sept. 19, 2005), 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kpstats.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2005). 
 14. See Thackeray, supra note 12, at 875 (noting the Bush Administration’s pronouncement 
that compliance with the protocol would be “potentially prohibitive,” and that “drastic cuts in 
emissions will have serious repercussions on the US economy”). 
 15. See id. (detailing the Bush Administration’s “outright hostility” toward the Kyoto 
Process). 
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process.16 The shareholder proposal process is a procedure where 
eligible shareholders propose resolutions at annual shareholder 
meetings that request company boards to undertake specified 
actions. 17  If the resolutions meet statutory guidelines, they are 
published in the company’s annual proxy statement and all the 
company’s shareholders vote to endorse or reject the proposal.18 
Shareholder proposals that address climate change typically urge 
company boards to report on the company’s operational 
contributions to global warming, and to address business exposure to 
regulatory and market pressures.19 The shareholder proposal process 
potentially gives shareholders significant influence over corporate 
management, and there has been significant controversy over the 
proper scope of its use.20 
Part II of this comment provides an overview of the shareholder 
proposal process under the 1934 Securities Act. 21  Part II also 
describes how environmentally conscious shareholders have used 
shareholder proposals to influence corporate behavior, and explains 
why climate change is a significant social policy and investment issue 
that is applicable to the shareholder proposal process.22 Part III 
illustrates the problems with the current SEC no-action letter process, 
and demonstrates that SEC decisions regarding climate change 
shareholder proposals during the years 1998-2005 have been 
inconsistent and even contradictory.23 Part III also analyzes current 
commentary criticizing the shareholder proposal process, and 
provides recommendations on how the SEC could reform the process 
to ensure more predictable results.24 
 
 16. See Robert Monks et al., Shareholder Activism on Environmental Issues: A Study of 
Proposals at Large U.S. Corporations (2000-2003), 28 NAT. RESOURCES F. 317, 317-19 (2004) 
(explaining how investors conduct socially responsible investing through the use of shareholder 
proposals). 
 17. Id. at 318. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. at 324 (illustrating how shareholder proposals address climate change). 
 20. See Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders 
Say Yes? Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23, 24 (2004) (introducing the 
debate over the proper use of shareholder proposals). 
 21. Infra, Parts II.A, II.C. 
 22. Infra Part II.B. 
 23. Infra Part III.A. 
 24. Infra Part III.B-C. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Shareholder Proposals, the Securities Act of 1934, and the SEC 
Companies hold annual shareholder meetings where 
shareholders vote on important corporate management issues, such as 
mergers and acquisitions, sales of substantial assets, director 
elections, and amendments to articles of incorporation. 25  The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allows eligible shareholders to 
submit shareholder proposals at these meetings.26  A shareholder 
proposal is a shareholder recommendation or requirement that a 
company take a specified course of action.27 Shareholders vote to 
approve or disapprove the proposal at annual company shareholder 
meetings.28 
However, the 1934 Act allows a company to exclude proposals 
from shareholder meetings if 1) the proposal fails to comply with the 
statutory procedural or eligibility guidelines,29 or 2) the proposal’s 
subject matter is excludable under one of the statutory exceptions.30 
To exclude a shareholder proposal, a company must file with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission 1) a copy of the proposal, 2) 
any statement in support of the proposal submitted by the proponent, 
and 3) a statement of the company’s reasons why the omission is 
proper in the particular case.31 
A company may also request the SEC to issue a no-action letter; 
the SEC staff will inform the company whether it believes that the 
company can properly exclude a proposal after considering the facts 
 
 25. See, e.g., Shireen B. Rahnema, The SEC’s Reversal of Cracker Barrel: A Return to 
Uncertainty, 7 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 273, 283 (1999) (explaining the corporate context in 
which shareholder proposals operate). 
 26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2006). 
 27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (2006). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-8(a)-(h) (2006) (outlining the shareholder eligibility and 
procedural requirements that a shareholder must follow in order to submit a shareholder 
proposal). 
 30. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2006) (listing the basis upon which a company can exclude 
shareholder proposals: 1) improper under state law, 2) violation of law, 3) violation of proxy 
rules, 4) personal grievance, 5) relevance, 6) absence of power/authority, 7) management 
functions, 8) relates to election, 9) conflicts with company’s proposal, 10) substantially 
implemented, 11) duplication, 12) resubmissions, and 13) specific amount of dividends). 
 31. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart, 821 F. Supp. 877, 883 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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and reasoning presented by both the proponent and the company.32 In 
addition to no-action letters, the SEC issues interpretative releases33 
and staff legal bulletins34 that clarify and direct the shareholder 
proposal process. 
However, SEC agency interpretations or decisions do not 
prevent a party from bringing an enforcement action in court.35 
Courts give deference to both SEC interpretive releases and no-
action letters but agency decisions are not binding.36 When a court 
interprets an SEC regulation or ruling, the SEC’s general 
interpretation is controlling unless the court decides the 
interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.37 
Courts award SEC interpretative releases more deference than 
SEC no-action letters. 38  Interpretative releases provide formal 
guidance and seek to introduce general and consistent principles on a 
particular issue, but SEC no-action letters address specific issues that 
arise in the SEC’s “daily contact with the practical workings of this 
rule” and are ad-hoc in nature.39 However, courts have relied upon 
SEC no-action letters when deciding the excludability of a proposal, 
analyzing their reasoning and their consistency or inconsistency of 
positions on particular issues.40 Courts are the final arbiters in the 
shareholder proposal process.41 
 
 32. See Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental Activism and the 
Ethical Investor, 22 J. CORP. L. 465, 490 (1997) (describing the SEC no-action letter process). 
 33. See, e.g., Amendments to Rules of Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-40018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29106 (May 28, 1998) [hereinafter Amendments] (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 240) (providing legal guidance regarding shareholder proposals). 
 34. See, e.g., SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C, June 28, 2005, http://www.sec.gov/ 
interps/legal/cfslb14c.htm [hereinafter Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C] (clarifying the shareholder 
proposal process). 
 35. Geltman & Skroback, supra note 32, at 490. 
 36. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart, 821 F. Supp. 877, 883 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 885 (explaining how courts construe SEC interpretative releases and SEC no-
action letters). 
 39. Id. at 884. 
 40. Id. at 885. 
 41. See Roosevelt v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(holding that shareholders may seek “declaratory and injunctive relief [in court] when 
management refuses to distribute their proposals”). 
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B. The Environment, Climate Change, and Shareholder Proposals 
Activists have frequently used shareholder proposals to advocate 
better corporate environmental responsibility.42 For example, after 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1991, shareholders filed numerous 
proposals requiring companies to adopt environmentally friendly 
practices known as the Valdez Principles. 43  The principles required 
corporations, among other things, to voluntarily adhere to greater 
environmental disclosure requirements.44 
Social awareness is not the only driving factor behind 
shareholder proposals advocating better corporate environmental 
performance; investors focus on a company’s environmental 
performance because a bad environmental record equals financial 
liabilities.45 The Exxon Valdez oil spill cost Exxon over $2 billion in 
clean up costs.46 Shareholders react to losses on their investment, and 
environmental liabilities create financial costs that drive down the 
value of investments.47 
Investors cannot ignore the effects of climate change because it 
exposes companies to various types of risks and these risks affect the 
value of investments. 48  Companies face regulatory risk as 
governments increase regulation in order to meet international and 
 
 42. See Geltman & Skroback, supra note 32, at 477 (illustrating how environmental groups 
use proxy rights and shareholder meetings to initiate changes in corporate practices impacting 
the environment). 
 43. See Nell Minow & Michael Deal, Corporations, Shareholders, and the Environmental 
Agenda, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1365-66 (1991) (reviewing shareholder proposal activity 
after the Exxon-Valdez oil spill). 
 44. See id., at 1365-66 (listing the ten Valdez principles: 1) Protection of the Biosphere, 2) 
Sustainable Use of Natural Resources, 3) Reduction and Disposal of Waste, 4) Wise Use of 
Energy, 5) Risk Reduction, 6) Marketing Safe Products and Services, 7) Damage 
Compensation, 8) Disclosure, 9) Environmental Directors and Managers, and 10) Assessment 
and Annual Audit). 
 45. See id. at 1365 (asserting that “environmental violations carry stiff penalties, extensive 
clean up costs, and dramatic loss of public goodwill”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green Reports: “Cumulative Materiality” in 
Corporate Environmental Disclosure After Sarbanes-Oxley, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 490-91 
(2005) (arguing that corporate measures that protect the environment may protect the value of 
investments). 
 48. See CERES & WORLD RES. INST., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR INVESTORS ON 
CLIMATE RISK 3 (CERES & World Res. Inst. eds., 2004), available at 
http://www.ceres.org/pub/docs/Ceres%5Fqanda%5FInvestors%5Fon%5FClimate%5FRisk%5
F1204.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATE RISK] (listing the numerous climate change risk factors that 
affect the value of investments). 
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national commitments to decrease greenhouse gas emission levels.49 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol is currently the most notable international 
greenhouse gas emission regulatory scheme and global companies 
must spend substantial resources in order to comply.50 Corporations 
face competitiveness risk because if they do not mitigate climate risk 
factors they will become less competitive in relation to their 
competitors who have taken proactive measures.51 Companies that 
develop clean technologies and innovative approaches are in a better 
position to adapt to a growing regulatory environment52 and will likely 
seize new markets or obtain greater market shares.53 
Climate change also brings physical risk in the form of increased 
droughts, floods, storms and a global sea level rise and this will affect 
businesses and their bottom line.54 For example, climate change will 
have a detrimental impact on the insurance industry.55 Insurance 
companies calculate insurance rates on the basis of historical data, but 
more frequent and unpredictable catastrophic weather-related 
disasters will render historical data unreliable and actuarial risk 
assessment nearly impossible.56 Mistakes in insurance rate calculations 
could potentially bankrupt the industry.57 
 
 49. See id. (predicting that high greenhouse gas-emitting industries like electric power, 
manufacturing, oil and gas, and transportation will face increasing regulation and rising financial 
compliance costs). 
 50. Elizabeth E. Hancock, Red Dawn, Blue Thunder, Purple Rain: Corporate Risk of 
Liability for Global Climate Change and the SEC Disclosure Dilemma, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 233, 239 (2005). 
 51. CLIMATE RISK, supra note 48, at 4. 
 52. See DURWOOD ZAELKE, ET. AL. EDS., 2 MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLIANCE & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 434-35 (2005) (explaining how properly 
designed environmental regulations can pressure companies to innovate and that these 
innovations will result in greater efficiencies which offset the costs of compliance). 
 53. CERES & UNITED NATIONS FOUND., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SUMMIT ON CLIMATE 
RISK: FINAL REPORT 23 (CERES ed. 2003) available at 
http://www.ceres.org/pub/docs/Ceres%5F2005IISummit%5Ffinalreport%5F1005.pdf. 
 54. See id. at 22 (illustrating how the physical effects of climate change directly affects 
sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, health care, insurance and tourism); see also Fiona Harvey, 
Katrina: ‘First Taste of a Bitter Cup’, FIN. TIMES, Oct 10, 2005, (FT Report – Sustainable 
Business) at 1 (reporting that Hurricane Katrina is one example of how climate change has 
contributed to increases in severe weather activity). 
 55. See Michael Northrop, Leading by Example: Profitable Corporate Strategies and 
Successful Public Policies for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 14 WIDENER L.J. 21, 32 
(2004) (describing the insurance industry’s reliance upon historical climate data for accurate risk 
assessment). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. (noting that if insurance calculations are based on unreliable historical data 
“there will be no difference between insurance and gambling”). 
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Corporations that neglect the climate change issue will also face 
reputational risk as the general public and consumers become more 
aware of the climate change issue.58 Companies like ExxonMobil are 
becoming targets for boycotts because of their opposition to climate 
change regulation.59 Companies that are responsible for high levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions may also face litigation risk as plaintiffs sue 
companies with high greenhouse level emissions for damages 
associated with the physical effects of climate change.60 
However, despite the risks involved with ignoring the 
consequences of climate change, companies rarely ratify and adopt 
shareholder proposals that address climate change. 61  One study 
conducted a review of shareholder proposals at eighty-one United 
States corporations during the years 2000-2003 and found that climate 
change resolutions only received an average support of thirteen 
percent over the four year period.62 In addition, under most state laws, 
shareholder proposals are not binding upon corporations unless their 
corporate by-laws stipulate otherwise; even majority shareholder 
support may not automatically ensure that a company board will 
implement a proposal’s directives.63 
Nevertheless, a shareholder proposal does not need a majority 
vote or favorable corporate by-laws to realize its objectives.64 In many 
cases a significant minority vote on a specific issue is likely to 
influence management behavior. 65  Company boards are wary of 
shareholder reaction and accord shareholder resolutions 
 
 58. See CLIMATE RISK, supra note 48, at 4 (noting that a company’s reputation in regards 
to climate change will affect an informed consumer’s loyalty to that company). 
 59. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Environmental Groups Planning to Urge Boycott of 
ExxonMobil, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2005, at A14. (reporting on environmental groups planning a 
boycott of ExxonMobil products). 
 60. See Hancock, supra note 49, at 242-49 (analyzing the potential for litigation 
surrounding the effects of climate change); see also Julie Ziegler, Nigerian Court Orders an End 
to Gas Flaring; If Companies Don’t Stop, Prison Time a Possibility, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 
Nov. 15, 2005, at 10 (reporting on a Nigerian federal court ruling that enjoins Royal Dutch Shell, 
Chevron, ExxonMobil and other oil companies in Nigeria to stop gas flaring or risk prison time 
and fines). 
 61. Monks et al., supra note 16, at 319. 
 62. See id. at 321 (analyzing shareholder support for corporate social responsibility 
proposals during the years 2000-2003). 
 63. Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 20, 41. 
 64. See Monks et al., supra note 16, at 319 (asserting that there is no exact definition of 
what constitutes a “passing vote” in shareholder resolutions because even a significant minority 
shareholder pressure on management can effect change). 
 65. See id. (illustrating how the shareholder proposal process is more akin to “a survey of 
shareholder sentiment rather than . . . a political election”). 
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corresponding attention. 66  This is increasingly true in today’s 
corporate governance climate because recent increases in 
governmental legislation and shareholder activism are fostering 
greater corporate transparency and accountability.67 Consequently, a 
proponent’s ability to include and maintain a proposal on a 
company’s annual proxy statement is a key success factor in the 
shareholder proposal process.68 However, statutory exceptions under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 inhibit the ability to submit 
shareholder proposals.69 
C. Shareholder Proposals May Not Relate to a Corporation’s 
“Ordinary Business” 
Rule 14a-8(i)(7) is a statutory exception under the 1934 Act that 
allows a company to exclude shareholder proposals that deal with 
matters relating to the company’s “ordinary business operations.”70 
The ordinary business exception allows a company to exclude 
proposals that involve business matters that are mundane in nature, 
and do not involve any substantial policy or other considerations.71 
The exception is consistent with most state corporate laws that 
maintain that it is the corporate officers and boards, not shareholders, 
who manage a corporation’s ordinary business affairs.72 Under state 
law, corporate boards have a fiduciary duty to act independently in a 
company’s best interests and “mechanical compliance” with 
shareholder proposals can potentially violate this fiduciary duty.73 
The ordinary business exception has had a confusing history; the 
exception’s vague language and inconsistent SEC interpretation has 
resulted in much debate and litigation.74 The SEC currently follows a 
 
 66. Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 20, at 68-69. 
 67. See id. at 66 (discussing the transformation in corporate governance climate after the 
notable Enron and WorldCom scandals and legislation like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
 68. See Monks et al., supra note 16, at 319 (explaining that simply placing a proposal on the 
proxy statement is likely to increase awareness among shareholders, as well as the general 
public, and to pressure management action). 
 69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2006). 
 70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(i)(7) (2006). 
 71. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act 
Release No. 12999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52994, 52997 (Dec. 3, 1976) [hereinafter Adoption of 
Amendments]. 
 72. See Amendments, supra note 33, at 29108-29109 (explaining the rationale behind the 
ordinary business exception). 
 73. Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 20, at 42-44. 
 74. Phillip R. Stanton, SEC Reverses Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 
979, 981-90 (1999). 
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case-by-case approach, and there are no binding rules or guidelines.75 
However, the SEC does identify two factors that it considers when 
conducting an ordinary business analysis.76 
First, the SEC considers a proposal’s subject matter and will 
approve a company’s decision to exclude the proposal if it relates to 
tasks “fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a 
day-to-day basis.”77 However, if the same proposal focuses on a 
sufficiently significant social policy issue, the SEC asserts that such 
proposals are appropriate for a shareholder vote because such policy 
issues transcend day-to-day matters.78 Second, the SEC looks to the 
degree to which the proposal seeks to “micromanage” the company.79 
Shareholders are not in a position to make an informed judgment 
about matters that involve intricate detail, specific time-frames or 
complex policy implementation, and a company may exclude such 
proposals.80 
In addition, the SEC has provided further guidance on the 
ordinary business exception through a staff legal bulletin, specifically 
addressing shareholder proposals that relate to environmental 
issues.81 The SEC advised that a company may exclude proposals that 
require it to conduct “an internal assessment of the risks or liabilities 
that the company faces as a result of its operations that may adversely 
affect the environment.”82 However, a company is not allowed to 
exclude proposals that focus on its minimizing or eliminating 
operations that may harm the environment.83 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Problems with an Inconsistent SEC No-action Letter Process 
Despite the SEC’s attempts to provide guidance on the ordinary 
business exception through interpretative releases and staff legal 
bulletins, the SEC’s current case-by-case approach has resulted in 
 
 75. Amendments, supra note 33, at 29108. 
 76. Id. at 29108-09 
 77. Id. at 29108. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C, supra note 34, at 4-5 (explaining how the SEC 
analyzes environmental proposals that relate to an “evaluation of risk”). 
 82. Id. at 5. 
 83. Id. 
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inconsistent no-action letter positions.84 Courts understand that the 
no-action letter process is ad-hoc and inconsistent.85 The SEC faces 
staff and time constraints and cannot afford no-action letters “the 
kind of in-depth study that would be essential to a definitive 
determination.” 86  However, although courts do not defer to an 
individual no-action letter position, they have relied on the 
consistency or inconsistency of the SEC’s position on no-action letter 
issues.87 
The SEC no-action letter process serves as an important 
guidepost for courts.  However, inconsistencies in SEC decisions have 
the potential to confuse judicial decision-making, which in turn 
promotes inefficiencies for both shareholders and company boards.88 
In order for participants to find it useful, the SEC no-action letter 
process needs to be consistent.  But an analysis of SEC no-action 
letters regarding climate change shareholder proposals during the 
years 1998-2005 reveals that SEC guidance on the matter is still 
lacking and that reform is needed. 
1. The SEC Needs to Articulate its Reasoning Behind No-
action Letter Decisions: When Words Speak Louder than Actions 
The SEC currently does not articulate the reasoning behind its 
no-action letter decisions, and simply states its concurrence or its 
disagreement with a company’s request to exclude the proposal from 
its proxy statements.89 This lack of transparency becomes especially 
pronounced when the SEC makes inconsistent decisions on 
shareholder proposals that essentially encompass the same 
substantive request.90 
In a February 1, 2005 no-action letter, the SEC did not allow the 
Ryland Group to exclude a shareholder proposal which requested the 
 
 84. See Amendments, supra note 33, at  29108 (recognizing that the SEC has repeatedly 
adjusted its definition of “ordinary business” and will now follow a case-by-case approach). 
 85. See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart, 821 F. Supp. 877, 
885 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (declaring that a court does not need to defer to an individual no-action 
letter position). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Rahnema, supra note 25, at 297 (asserting that fluctuating and contradictory SEC 
no-action letter decisions will encourage displeased shareholders and managers to litigate in 
court). 
 89. See e.g., The Ryland Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
145, at *1 (Feb. 1, 2005). 
 90. See Amendments, supra note 33, at 29108 (acknowledging that the lack of bright-line 
rules will render some no-action letter decisions tenuous). 
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Ryland Group to report on “how the company is responding to rising 
regulatory, competitive, and public pressure to increase energy 
efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas[es].”91 However, in a January 8, 
2005 no-action letter, the SEC allowed Wachovia to exclude a 
shareholder proposal that requested Wachovia to report on how 
climate change risk factors affected Wachovia’s business strategy.92 
The proposal requested that the board of directors prepare a report 
including “a discussion of the effects of (a) rising public and 
regulatory pressures to limit the emission of greenhouse gases, and 
(b) changes in the physical environment.”93 
The SEC allowed Wachovia to exclude the proposal because it 
related to an evaluation of risk.94 Wachovia argued that climate 
change risk evaluation is a part of its day-to-day operations in 
determining the value of its financial products, and the proposal 
essentially would summarize Wachovia’s ordinary business 
operations.95 However, the Ryland Shareholder proposal also requires 
risk evaluation.96 A report on how the company is responding to rising 
regulatory, competitive, and public pressures necessarily involves an 
assessment of risk factors that affect a company’s financial and 
competitive position.97 Notwithstanding the similarities, the SEC did 
not allow the Ryland group to exclude the proposal.98 
The Wachovia shareholder proposal and the Ryland Group 
shareholder proposal encompass the same request for a discussion of 
rising public and regulatory pressures and its impact on business 
strategy.99 The difference in outcome illustrates the problem with an 
opaque no-action letter process; decisions appear ad-hoc and 
inconsistent because the SEC does not articulate the reasoning 
behind its no-action letter decisions. 
 
 91. The Ryland Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 89, at *23. 
 92. Wachovia Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 LEXIS 128, at *1 (Mar. 23, 2005). 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. Id. at *1. 
 95. Id. at *12-*15. 
 96. The Ryland Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 88, at *15-*17. 
 97. Id. at *15-*16. 
 98. Id. at *1. 
 99. Compare The Ryland Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 89, at *17-*19 
(arguing that the proposal requires the Ryland Group to report on the company’s ability to 
comply with rising regulatory pressures and seeks to micromanage the company) with Wachovia 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 92, at *13-14 (arguing that the proposal’s requirement 
that Wachovia provide a report on rising regulatory pressures to limit greenhouse gases focuses 
on Wachovia’s fundamental day-to-day activities). 
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2. SEC Decisions Appear to Turn on Semantic Differences: It’s 
All In How You Say It 
The SEC currently allows companies to exclude shareholder 
proposals that require an evaluation of risk.100 However, it is unclear 
how the SEC construes risk evaluation because SEC no-action letter 
decisions often appear to turn on semantic, not substantive, 
differences in shareholder proposals. 
In a March 23, 2005 no-action letter, the SEC addressed an 
ExxonMobil shareholder proposal that requested the company to 
“undertake a comprehensive review and publish a report on how it 
will meet the greenhouse gas reduction targets of those countries in 
which it operates which have adopted the Kyoto Protocol.”101 The 
proponents hoped the report would contain 1) cost projection, 2) 
timelines for meeting mandatory targets, 3) an evaluation of whether 
earlier actions, as undertaken by key ExxonMobil competitors, would 
have reduced these costs, and 4) a feasibility study of reducing 
emissions in the United States, which does not have restrictions on 
emissions at the federal level but might implement them in the 
future.102 
ExxonMobil argued that the proposal should be excluded on the 
grounds that it requested an “evaluation of risks and benefits.”103 The 
SEC did not concur.104 This decision creates two inferences: 1) climate 
change is a sufficiently significant policy issue that transcends day-to-
day matters, and 2) the proposal’s requests did not attempt to micro-
manage the company.105 Consequently, it logically follows that the 
SEC will support shareholder proposals that contain substantively 
similar requests to the ExxonMobil proposal. 
However on April 1, 2003 the SEC allowed Xcel Energy to 
exclude a shareholder proposal that also addressed climate change.  
The proposal requested a report on “a) the economic risks associated 
with the Company’s past, present, and future emissions . . . and the 
public stance of the company regarding efforts to reduce these 
emissions and b) the economic benefits of committing to a substantial 
 
 100. Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C, supra note 34, at 5. 
 101. ExxonMobil, Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 466, at *1 (Mar. 
23, 2005). 
 102. Id.at *39. 
 103. Id. at *19. 
 104. Id. at *1. 
 105. See Amendments, supra note 33, at 29108-29109 (articulating the considerations in an 
ordinary business analysis). 
04__CHOI.DOC 2/6/2007  4:58 PM 
178 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 17:165 
reduction of those emissions related to its current business 
activities.”106 
Xcel argued that the proposal seeks an “appraisal of the 
economic risks and benefits concerning the emission of certain 
pollutants” and that a financial evaluation of risks is a fundamental 
part of ordinary business operations.107 Similarly, ExxonMobil argued 
that the SEC should exclude its proposal because it related to “risks 
and potential benefits faced by ExxonMobil in connection with a 
particular regulatory compliance issue.”108 Both proposals address 
climate change, and both proposals advocate risk evaluation which 
address the financial and economic competitiveness of the company.109 
However, the SEC reached contradictory decisions in the 
ExxonMobil and Xcel Energy no-action letters. The difference in 
outcome appears to be based on the proposals’ semantics and not 
their substantive content; arguably, the SEC would have excluded the 
ExxonMobil proposal as relating to an evaluation of risks and 
benefits if the ExxonMobil proposal used the words “report on the 
economic risks” instead of “provide a comprehensive review.”110 
3. The SEC Appears to Distinguish Between Industries When 
Conducting an Ordinary Business Analysis: Pick and Choose Your 
Industry 
The SEC appears to differentiate between different industries 
when deciding whether a climate change proposal is excludable as 
relating to an evaluation of risk under the ordinary business 
exception. The SEC is likely to concur with industries where risk 
evaluation is a core business function, as in the financial services 
industry and insurance industry where risk evaluation is the business 
itself.111 However, the SEC is not likely to concur with industries 
where risk evaluation is an internal business function; industries 
 
 106. Xcel Energy Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 LEXIS 500, at *1 (April 1 2003). 
 107. Id. at *7. 
 108. ExxonMobil, Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at *19 (arguing that the 
proposal should be excluded because it is an ordinary business matter). 
 109. Compare id. at *40 (requesting a report including projections of greenhouse reduction 
costs, and an evaluation of whether earlier action would have reduced such costs) with Xcel 
Energy Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 106, at * 1 (asking for a report on economic 
risks associated with carbon dioxide emissions). 
 110. See Xcel Energy Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 105, at *1 (allowing the 
company to exclude a shareholder proposal that called for disclosing “economic risks” as an 
“evaluation of risks and benefits”). 
 111. See, e.g., The Chubb Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC LEXIS 115, at *12-*14 
(Jan. 25, 2004). 
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where risk evaluation is a secondary to its main business operations 
but conducted in order to ensure operational viability.112 
In 2005, the SEC allowed the Chubb Corporation to exclude a 
shareholder proposal that requested “a report . . . . . .providing a 
comprehensive assessment of Chubb’s strategies to address the 
impacts of climate change on its business.”113 The Chubb Corporation 
is an insurance provider, and it argued that company’s core business 
centers on the management and evaluation of risks.114 Climate change 
has a bearing on how the Company evaluates risks and it accounts for 
such risks when “writing insurance policies and pricing its 
products. . . .”115 
In 2004, the SEC also allowed the American International Group 
to exclude a proposal that requested “a report . . . . . .providing a 
comprehensive assessment of AIG’s strategies to address the impacts 
of climate change on its business.” 116  AIG is also an insurance 
provider, and it also argued that the proposal relates to the company’s 
core business of underwriting risk.117 The impacts of climate change 
are taken into account when determining insurance coverage and 
costs, and “the proposal relates directly to the company’s policies and 
practices for product offerings.”118 
Compare the above no-action decisions with a series of climate 
change shareholder proposals filed at energy companies during the 
2004 and 2003 proxy season. In a March 5, 2004 no-action letter the 
SEC did not allow Reliant Resources Inc. to exclude a shareholder 
proposal on the basis that it related to the company’s ordinary 
business.119  The proposal requested Reliant’s board to “assess how 
the company is responding to rising, regulatory, competitive, and 
public pressure to significantly reduce carbon dioxide and other 
 
 112. See, e.g., Unocoal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 394, at *10-
*11 (Feb. 23, 2004) (asserting that an energy company’s assessment of “rising regulatory, 
competitive and public pressure” on its operations constitutes risk evaluation). 
 113. The Chubb Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 111, at  *19. 
 114. See id. at *16 (asserting the subject matter of the proposal involves a matter of ordinary 
business). 
 115. Id. at *13. 
 116. American International Group. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
260, at *21-*22 (Feb. 11, 2004). 
 117. Id. at *16. 
 118. Id. at *16-*17. 
 119. Reliant Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 460, at *1 
(Mar. 5, 2004). 
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emissions and report to shareholders.”120 The SEC also refused to 
allow corporate boards at the Unocal Corporation,121 the Valero 
Energy Corporation, 122  the Apache Corporation, 123  and Anadarko 
Corporation,124 to exclude identical shareholder proposals. 
Reliant argued that the SEC should allow it to exclude the 
shareholder proposal because the proposal requested an evaluation of 
risk, concentrating on the economic benefits and risks the company 
faces regarding emissions reductions.125 However, the SEC did not 
allow Reliant to exclude the shareholder proposal.126  In contrast to 
the AIG proposal, the SEC refused to find that the proposal related 
to risk evaluation.127 
In addition, in a February 6, 2004 no-action letter, the SEC did 
not agree with Valero Corp.’s view that Valero could exclude the 
proposal as relating to an evaluation of risk.128 However, the potential 
impact of petroleum products and by-products are very important 
risk variables in refinery management; the Valero Corporation had 
already installed oversight systems to ensure regulatory compliance, 
evaluate competitive and reputation risks, and their respective 
economic consequences.129 Thus, the Valero shareholder proposal that 
requested an assessment of “rising regulatory, competitive, and public 
pressure to significantly reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gas emissions”130 is arguably asking Valero Corp. to undertake risk 
evaluation that is excludable under the ordinary business exception. 
But the SEC did not agree. 
Consequently, it appears that the SEC differentiates between 
shareholder proposals at industries where risk evaluation is an 
internal business function, as in the Reliant and Valero no-action 
 
 120. Id. at *17. 
 121. Unocoal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 112, at *1. 
 122. Valero Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 204, at *1 
(Feb. 6, 2004). 
 123. Apache Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 225, at *1 (Feb. 6, 
2004). 
 124. Anadarko, Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 234, at 
*3 (Feb. 4, 2004). 
 125. Reliant Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 119, at *7. 
 126. Id. at *1. 
 127. See American International Group. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 116, at *1 
(excluding the proposal as relating to “evaluation of risks and benefits”). 
 128. Valero Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 122, at *1. 
 129. Id.  at *6-*10. 
 130. Id. at *16. 
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letters, from shareholder proposals at industries where risk evaluation 
addresses core business functions, as found in the Chubb Corp. and 
AIG proposals.131 However, this apparent distinction between core 
business risk evaluation and internal business risk evaluation is not in 
conformance with the SEC’s own guidelines. In a staff legal bulletin, 
the SEC specifically addressed environmental shareholder proposals 
and advised that companies may exclude such proposals if they relate 
to an evaluation of risk.  Specifically, a company may exclude 
proposals that address internal risk and liability assessments that a 
company faces as a result of its operations that may adversely affect 
the environment.132 Under this definition the SEC should afford 
climate change shareholder proposals at all industries the same 
treatment so long as they relate to an evaluation of risk. But the 
results, as seen above, are inconsistent. 
4. The SEC is Unclear on What Constitutes an Excludable 
Shareholder Request for an Intricate Report 
Climate change shareholder proposals generally ask a company 
to report on climate change effects on business but do not ask 
companies to undertake actual operational steps to mitigate climate 
change effects. 133  A shareholder proposal that requests that a 
company undertake operational steps is clearly an attempt to dictate 
managerial action. 134  However, it is unclear when a shareholder 
reporting request becomes an attempt to dictate managerial action, or 
constitutes a demand for an “intricate report,” which is excludable 
under the ordinary business exception.135 
In a March 2, 2004 no-action letter. the SEC concurred with the 
Ford Motor Company that it could exclude a shareholder proposal 
that requested the company to provide an annual report on climate 
change science, including “detailed information on temperatures, 
atmospheric gases, sun effects, carbon dioxide production, carbon 
dioxide absorbtion, and costs and benefits at various degrees of 
 
 131. Compare American International Group. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 116, 
at *1 (excluding the proposal as relating to “evaluation of risks”) with Reliant Resources, Inc., 
SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 119, at *1 (refusing to exclude the shareholder proposal 
despite arguments that it related to risk evaluation). 
 132. Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C, supra note 34, at 4-5 (2005). 
 133. E.g., ExxonMobil, Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at *1. 
 134. Amendments, supra note 33, at 29108. 
 135. See id. 
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heating and cooling.”136  The SEC reasoned that the proposal related 
to ordinary business operations because it demanded “the specific 
method of preparation and the specific information to be included in 
a highly detailed report.”137 The Ford Motor Company argued that 
there are a “myriad of reasons” that determine company policy 
decisions, and that it would “cause havoc for companies to have such 
decisions subject to examination by shareholders.”138 The Company 
also argued that it has limited resources and it is the directors’ 
prerogative, not the shareholders’, when deciding to use corporate 
resources to “expend additional capital to either confirm or disprove 
scientific studies regarding global warming. . . .”139 The Ford Motor 
company’s reasoning is correct in that management, not shareholders, 
should dictate how corporate resources are allocated.140 However, the 
Ford Motor Company’s argument that the shareholder proposal can 
be excluded because corporate policy is not an appropriate subject 
matter for shareholder consideration is wrong; the current 
shareholder process is specifically designed to allow shareholders to 
examine and influence corporate action in areas of significant social 
policy.141 
In a March 15, 2005 ExxonMobil no-action letter the SEC 
addressed a proposal very similar to the Ford proposal; the proposal 
requested the board of directors to “make available . . . . . .research 
data relevant to ExxonMobil’s stated position on the science of 
climate change.” 142  ExxonMobil’s argument followed Ford’s 
reasoning; the report was a “highly detailed report” because it 
requested “primary research data and a discussion of peer-reviewed 
publications in a highly technical field of science. . . .”143 However, 
despite the Ford proposal and ExxonMobil proposal’s similarities, the 
SEC reached opposite conclusions in the two no-action letter 
 
 136. Ford Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 441, at *1 (Mar. 2, 
2004). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at *27. 
 139. Id. at *28. 
 140. Amendments, supra note 33, at 29108. 
 141. Id. 
 142. ExxonMobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 414, at *1 (Mar. 
2, 2005). 
 143. Id. at *3. 
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decisions.144 Thus, it is unclear what exactly constitutes a highly 
detailed report and excludable under the ordinary business exception. 
Companies have also argued that shareholder reporting requests 
are unnecessary and moot because of the Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MD&A) disclosure requirements under the securities 
laws.145 These requirements already mandate disclosure of all material 
information relating to corporate operations, and companies argue 
that reports that only duplicate information already required or 
available have no value.146 Many shareholder requests for reports 
simply ask for a general assessment and greater disclosure 
surrounding management decisions; they do not “seek to impose 
specific time-frames or methods for implementing complex 
policies.” 147  Thus, companies argue that although such proposals 
cannot be excluded on “micro-managing” grounds, the SEC should 
nevertheless allow companies to exclude them because MD&A 
requirements render them moot.148 However this proposition ignores 
that a fundamental tenet of the shareholder proposal process is to 
facilitate shareholder participation in corporate decision-making.149 
Under the MD&A requirements it is the management, not the 
shareholders, who control the content of disclosure.150 Consequently, 
although a company’s management is required to make all material 
disclosures, the current trend is that companies do not sufficiently 
disclose or discuss climate change effects despite the risks involved.151 
 
 144. Compare Ford Motor Co., supra note 136, at *1 (allowing the company to exclude a 
proposal that requested the company to report on climate change science) with ExxonMobil 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 142, at *1 (refusing to allow the company to exclude a 
proposal that asked it to make available climate change research data). 
 145. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2006). 
 146. See, e.g., Cinergy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 LEXIS 159, at *23 (Feb. 5, 2003). 
 147. Amendments, supra note 33, at 29115. 
 148. See Cinergy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 146, at *23. 
 149. See Beth-Ann Roth, Proactive Corporate-Shareholder Relations: Filling the 
Communications Void, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 101, 102 (1998). 
 150. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2006). 
 151. See MICHELLE CHAN-FISHEL, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, THIRD SURVEY OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS OF AUTOMOBILE, INSURANCE, OIL & GAS, 
PETROCHEMICAL, AND UTILITIES COMPANIES, 3-4 (2004), 
http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/corpacct/wallstreet/secsurvey2004.pdf  (noting that although 
companies are reporting climate risk as a material risk in disclosures, serious reporting 
deficiencies exist in automobile, petrochemical and insurance sectors). 
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B. Commentator Proposals to Reform the Current Shareholder 
Proposal Process 
The current SEC approach in evaluating ordinary business and 
the lack of transparency behind its decisions has resulted in an ad-hoc 
and inconsistent no-action letter process. 152  Commentators have 
proposed various alternatives to the current approach and this section 
will identify and analyze four of the more persuasive proposals: 1) 
corporations and shareholders should increase shareholder 
participation through voluntary communicative measures,153 2) the 
SEC should create a separate Office of Shareholder Relations,154 3) 
the SEC can eliminate the ordinary business standard entirely in 
favor of a state law analysis,155 and 4) the SEC should adopt an 
“override mechanism” which will allow a designated percentage of 
shareholders to by-pass management decisions, and automatically 
place shareholder proposals on a proxy statement.156 
1. The SEC Should Encourage Better Voluntary Corporate-
Shareholder Communication 
Some commentators hold the view that the shareholder process 
is, and should remain, a limited communicative measure that permits 
shareholders to make advisory recommendations, not binding 
referendums.157 Thus, a solution to ensure shareholder participation in 
corporate governance should transcend a legal approach; companies 
should treat the problem as a corporate policy issue and voluntarily 
create mechanisms that will enhance shareholder-company 
communication.158 Although shareholder proposals do not constitute 
binding referendums, directors should treat majority vote resolutions 
seriously in today’s corporate governance climate. 159  Companies 
should set up shareholder relations departments that specialize in 
dealing with shareholder concerns and allow shareholders to 
 
 152. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 153. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 154. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 155. See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
 156. See discussion infra Part III.B.4. 
 157. See Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 20, at 74-75 (asserting that shareholder proposals 
are not binding but precatory under Rule 14a-8, and that management must ignore majority 
shareholder resolutions that may be contrary to its fiduciary duties under state law). 
 158. See id. at 75. 
 159. See id. (asserting that better communication between management and shareholders 
will also create the additional benefit of preempting shareholder proposals that address 
performance or compliance issues). 
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communicate directly with management.160 Corporate boards should 
also increase transparency in their decisions regarding shareholder 
proposals, and communicate their reasoning and decision-making 
procedures.161 
However a major problem with this communicative approach is 
that it is premised upon voluntary corporate and shareholder 
participation; although such corporate action is welcome, inevitably 
not all corporate boards will adopt such policy proposals.162 The 
approach places the onus on corporate boards to take the initiative.  
Because corporate boards have independent decision-making powers 
under state laws, they may simply choose to ignore these voluntary 
processes. 163  Company boards decide to exclude shareholder 
proposals under the ordinary business principle because they do not 
want such proposals on their shareholder agenda.  Better 
communication avenues do not necessarily change this cost-benefit 
analysis.164 
2. The SEC Should Create an Office of Shareholder Relations 
Other commentators have suggested that the SEC should 
institutionalize communication between shareholders and company 
boards.165 The SEC could set up an Office of Corporate-Shareholder 
Relations that is responsible for 1) providing information on 
programs that lead to healthy shareholder relations, 2) creating 
partnering programs for companies to share their experiences with 
each other, and 3) allowing the SEC to directly share its expertise 
with shareholder proponents. 166  The Office will provide a non-
adversarial contact forum for corporations and their shareholders.167 
However, the creation of a new institution simply formalizes the 
communicative approach discussed above and it contains the same 
 
 160. See Roth, supra note 149, at 119-20. 
 161. See Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 20, at 75-77 (recommending that a corporation 
publicly communicate its decisions regarding shareholder proposals because it is consistent with 
notions of good governance). 
 162. C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical 
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 80-81 (2002). 
 163. Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 20, at 75. But see Roth, supra note 149, at 120 
(arguing that SEC could standardize communicative avenues through regulation or 
interpretative pronouncement to facilitate conformance). 
 164. Monks et al., supra note 16, at 320. 
 165. See Roth, supra note 149, at 121-22. 
 166. Id. at 122. 
 167. Id. 
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voluntary compliance problems.  Without clearer legislative guidance, 
institutionalization may only add another variable into an already 
confusing process.168 
3. The SEC Should Consider Eliminating the Ordinary 
Business Exception in Favor of a State Law Analysis 
Other commentators have urged the SEC to eliminate the 
ordinary business exception entirely and instead determine a 
proponent’s right to place proposals on a company’s proxy statement 
by referring to the state law in with the company is incorporated.169 
Because an objective approach is not possible under the current SEC 
framework, they contend that a better solution is for the SEC to 
eliminate the ordinary business exception entirely.170 The SEC already 
conducts a state law analysis under Rule 14a-8,171 and eliminating the 
ordinary business exception will streamline the shareholder proposal 
process. 172  SEC interpretation of state law is likely to be more 
predictable because the SEC will be less likely to reverse itself under 
state interpretations than under the confusing standards that it has 
promulgated. 173  Moreover since state law already determines 
shareholders’ rights to present a proposal for action at a shareholder 
meeting, it logically follows that the right to place proposals in a 
corporate proxy statement should also turn on state substantive law.174 
However, this approach does not address the problems 
associated in determining whether a subject is a proper subject under 
state law.175 Eliminating the ordinary business exception in favor of a 
state law analysis may simply remove an inconsistent federal standard 
 
 168. See Rahnema, supra note 25, at 294-96 (noting that the shareholder proposal process 
has had a very inconsistent history). 
 169. Kevin W. Waite, The Ordinary Business Exception to the Shareholder Proposal Rule: A 
Return to Predictability, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1274-76 (1995). 
 170. Id. at 1274. 
 171. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(i)(1) (2006) (stating that a company may exclude 
shareholder proposals that are “not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws 
of the jurisdiction of the company’s organization”). 
 172. See Waite, supra note 169, at 1276 (stating that deleting the exception essentially 
removes an extra analytical layer). 
 173. Id. at 1275. 
 174. See id. (arguing that federal proxy rules should not limit rights that derive from state 
law). 
 175. Cf. Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate 
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 120-21 (1988) (explaining that current state laws inhibit 
shareholder proposals because most proposals are drafted in precatory language to avoid the 
“proper subject” restriction). 
04__CHOI.DOC 2/6/2007  4:58 PM 
Fall 2006] SEC REGULATION CHANGES 187 
to a similarly confusing state standard. 176  Moreover, since state 
jurisdictions are free to adopt different “proper subject” standards, a 
stand-alone state law analysis may add more confusion to an already 
inconsistent process.177 Shareholders’ ability to influence management 
through the process may also be impaired as companies shop around 
for favorable jurisdictions that allow them greater flexibility to 
exclude shareholder proposals.178 
4. The SEC Should Adopt an Automatic Override Mechanism 
Another group of commentators contend that the Commission 
should adopt an “override mechanism” which will allow the owners of 
three percent of a company’s shares to essentially “override” a 
corporate management’s decision to exclude a proposal from its 
proxy materials.179 The SEC initially supported this proposal but it 
failed to adopt the mechanism.180 The automatic override mechanism 
is adverse to the basic notion that the directors, not the shareholders, 
are responsible for a corporation’s activities.181 However even if the 
SEC granted shareholders this override mechanism, company 
directors may still choose to ignore shareholder proposals because 
they are advisory and not binding under most state jurisdictions.182 
Shareholder proponents measure success by their ability to place 
and maintain policy issues on a company’s agenda.183 An override 
mechanism will enable increased shareholder participation in 
corporate governance.  The mechanism works largely in favor of large 
institutional investors who are likely to own the necessary share 
holdings required to trigger the automatic override.184 Institutional 
investors are more sophisticated than individual shareholders, and the 
traditional justifications for limiting shareholder participation should 
not apply.185 Accordingly, the SEC should afford them greater latitude 
 
 176. See Waite, supra note 169, at 1276. 
 177. C.f. Christine L. Ayotte, Reevaluating the Shareholder Proposal Rule in the Wake of 
Cracker Barrel and the Era of Institutional Investors, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 511, 522-23 (1999). 
 178. See Waite, supra note 169, at 1275. 
 179. See Ayotte, supra note 177, at 553-54. 
 180. Id. at 554.  
 181. See Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 20, at 75. 
 182. See id. (reminding corporate boards facing majority shareholder resolutions that such 
resolutions are rarely legally binding). 
 183. See Ryan, supra note 175, at 121. 
 184. See Ayotte, supra note 177, at 531-32. 
 185. See id. at 555 (explaining that the limitations placed on shareholder participation in 
corporate governance are premised on the irrationality and procedural problems of individual 
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to participate and influence corporate management.186 Nevertheless, 
the SEC did not adopt the override mechanism and ignored the need 
to afford institutional investors greater latitude in the shareholder 
proposal process.187 
Commentators have also disagreed on the level at which the SEC 
should set the override mechanism’s threshold percentage. 188  A 
shareholder proponent will inevitably find it difficult to solicit proxies 
and engage in major publicity campaigns against large public 
corporations because of the practical and financial difficulties 
involved. 189  Thus, some have argued that even a three percent 
threshold is too high and that it should be lowered in order to 
increase the override mechanism’s overall effectiveness.190 
C. Recommendations 
1. The SEC Should Adopt a Combination of Current 
Commentator Proposals 
The SEC may find it useful to consider adopting combinations of 
the four approaches outlined above. For example, an SEC reform 
package that includes creating an SEC Office of Shareholder 
Relations, pressing for an agenda that increases voluntary corporate-
shareholder communication, and adopting a set percentage override 
mechanism will likely facilitate greater shareholder participation in 
corporate management.191 However, the approaches outlined above 
still fail to address a major problem of the shareholder process: the 
SEC does not provide sufficient guidance in regards to the ordinary 
business exception, and consequently SEC no-letter action decisions 
are ad-hoc and inconsistent.192 
 
and collective shareholders, and that these problems are not applicable to institutional 
investors). 
 186. See id. at 553. 
 187. See id. at 554. 
 188. See Rahnema, supra note 25, at 292. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 192. See Ayotte, supra note 177, at 551 (asserting that the Commission needs to expound a 
narrowly tailored definition of what constitutes an “ordinary business exception”). 
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2. The SEC Should Adopt a New Rule Based on Whether the 
Shareholder Proposal is Binding or Precatory 
The SEC should expound more substantive guidelines and devise 
rules that ensure more predictability in the no-action letter process.193 
In creating the new rules the SEC must recognize several central 
tenets in the shareholder process.  First, Congress devised the 
shareholder proposal process to ensure shareholder participation in 
corporate management, and SEC guidance must reflect this intent.194 
Second, the SEC cannot ignore the state law concept of fiduciary 
duty.  It is the directors, not the shareholders, who are responsible for 
corporate activities. 195  Third, the SEC must remember that 
shareholder resolutions are precatory in most jurisdictions and even 
majority resolutions are not binding on a company’s directors.196 
Consequently, even if the SEC gave shareholders unfettered access to 
corporate proxy statements, it is unlikely to usurp directors’ legal 
control of their corporations.197 
The SEC could adopt a new test that initially asks whether, given 
the corporation’s jurisdiction or by-laws, the shareholder proposal is 
binding or precatory.  If the proposal is binding, the SEC should refer 
back to the old ordinary business analysis and allow companies to 
exclude the proposal if it does not relate to a significant social policy 
issue or if it attempts to micromanage the company.198 On the other 
hand, if the resolution is precatory and advisory, the SEC should 
automatically allow proponents to include the proposal on a proxy 
statement.  In those circumstances, the benefit of inclusion (increased 
shareholder participation), 199  substantially outweighs the potential 
cost (restricting directors’ fiduciary duty responsibilities under state 
law),200 because precatory proposals cannot legally bind management 
and directors are still free to exercise their independent judgment.201 
 
 193. See id. (noting that the current rule is amorphous, without substantive definitions and 
rules of application, and left to administrative and judicial interpretation). 
 194. See Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 20, at 40. 
 195. Id. at 42. 
 196. Monks et al., supra note 16, at 319. 
 197. See id. (noting that directors maintain legal control over companies because 
shareholder proposals are precatory). 
 198. See Amendments, supra note 33, at 29108. 
 199. See Ayotte, supra note 177, at 521 (asserting that the SEC envisioned greater 
shareholder responsibility and participation in corporate activity when it created Rule 14a-8). 
 200. See Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 20, at 42. 
 201. See Monks et al., supra note 16, at 319. 
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3. The SEC Should Articulate its Reasoning Behind No-Action 
Letter Decisions 
In addition, the SEC should articulate its reasoning behind no-
action letter decisions, instead of merely concurring or not concurring 
with a company’s request to exclude a shareholder proposal. 202 
However, since the SEC receives a large volume of no-action letter 
requests every year, this suggestion may not be feasible given time 
and manpower constraints.203 Nonetheless, if the SEC could find the 
resources to provide even a short five hundred word-limit 
explanation, it will provide more substantive guidance than the 
current approach.204 
4. The SEC Should Create Shareholder Proposal Templates 
The SEC should create shareholder proposal templates that 
entail designated substantive limits.  These SEC templates will 
essentially carry the SEC seal of approval and guarantee a 
shareholder proponent’s access to a corporate proxy statement.  For 
example, one acceptable SEC template may say: “Proponents request 
that the company should (prepare a report) on how the company is 
(responding) to (social policy issue).” The SEC could thereafter 
condition this template on limitations such as 1) the company must 
provide a report but directors may choose to ignore its findings,205 2) 
the report must be provided at reasonable cost, in accordance to SEC 
stated word limits, and omit all proprietary information,206 3) the 
report must be limited to disclosure of information, or 4) the 
company need not present an analysis of the information disclosed, or 
of the stated policy issue.207 
 
 202. See, e.g., ExxonMobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 102, at *1 (refusing to 
concur with the company’s view without substantive explanation). 
 203. See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart, 821 F. Supp. 877, 
885 (S.D.N.Y 1993). 
 204. See id. (describing the current no-action letter process’ cursory nature). 
 205. See Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 20, at 42-43 (outlining the importance of 
independent managerial decisions). This limitation will insulate the decisions of boards of 
directors and limit shareholder pressure. Id. 
 206. See Amendments, supra note 33, at 29108 (explaining that proposals that seek 
“intricate detail” are excludable as attempts to “micro-manage” the company). This limitation 
will protect management from shareholder proposals that may “micro-manage” the company. 
Id. 
 207. See Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in 
Corporate Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 430-32 (1994) 
(discussing the corporate management versus shareholder participation dichotomy present in 
corporate governance issues). This limitation prevents shareholders from micro-managing the 
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This methodology will increase predictability in the SEC no-
action process because it allows shareholders to know exactly what 
proposals will be allowed by the SEC, and the substantive context to 
which these acceptable proposals are limited. The SEC may also find 
it useful to design several different shareholder templates that 
accommodate specific industry characteristics and needs.208 The SEC 
should continue to allow shareholders to design their own proposals 
but these individualized proposals will be subject to the additional 
tests previously outlined in this section.209 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Maldives is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate 
change; the entire Maldivian population and societal infrastructure is 
situated very close to mean sea level. 210  Climate change and 
consequent increases in global mean sea levels threatens the 
Maldivian way of life and even its existence.211 Although climate 
change will bring many devastating consequences, the United States 
government has yet to endorse the Kyoto Protocol or introduce 
commensurate domestic legislation in order to limit such effects212 
because climate change regulations will affect American business 
profitability.213 
Climate change raises significant social policy and environmental 
issues, and it is a proper subject matter for shareholder concern. 
Climate change has the potential to affect business profitability and 
affect investment value because it creates operational risks, 
regulatory risks, competitiveness risks, reputational risk, and 
litigation risks.214 However, the current shareholder proposal process 
does not adequately afford shareholders the tools for sufficient 
 
company while protecting the shareholders’ prerogative of influencing corporate behavior by 
raising social policy concerns. Id. 
 208. See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (asserting that the SEC appears to distinguish 
between industries when conducting an ordinary business analysis). 
 209. See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
 210. MALDIVES COMMUNICATION, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining that over 80% of the land 
of the Maldives is less than 1 m above mean sea level). 
 211. Id. (anticipating that climate change will have significant negative impacts on Maldivian 
society and even a 1 m rise in sea level would result in the loss of the entire land area of the 
Maldives). 
 212. Thackeray, supra note 12, at 874-75. 
 213. See id. at 875 (quoting President G.W. Bush declaring that Kyoto Protocol compliance 
“will have serious repercussions on the U.S. economy”). 
 214. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text. 
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shareholder participation in corporate governance.215 The SEC allows 
a company to exclude shareholder proposals if the proposals relate to 
the company’s ordinary business, despite the fact that these proposals 
rarely receive majority support and are non-binding and precatory 
under most state jurisdictions.216 Moreover, vacillating SEC guidance 
on the matter has created inconsistent and contradictory no-action 
letter decisions which have the potential to confuse courts, 
shareholders, and company boards.217 
The SEC should consider reforming the current shareholder 
proposal process through adopting a reform package: 1) creating an 
SEC Office of Shareholder Relations, 2) pressing for an agenda that 
increases voluntary corporate-shareholder communication, 3) 
adopting a set percentage override mechanism, 4) adopting a new test 
based upon whether the shareholder proposal’s content is binding or 
precatory, and 5) issuing shareholder proposal templates that contain 
condition-subsequent limitations. 218  The reforms should ensure 
greater predictability in SEC no-action letter decisions and allow 
maximum shareholder participation in corporate governance, while 
also adhering to state law requirements that it the corporate boards, 
not the shareholders, are responsible for corporate actions and 
decision-making. 
 
 215. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 216. See Monks et al., supra note 16, at 319 (noting that in most states shareholder proposals 
are not binding upon corporations). 
 217. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 218. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
